Abstract. Meseguer's rewriting logic and the rewriting logic CRWL are two well known approaches to rewriting as logical deduction that, despite some clear similarities, were designed with di erent objectives. Here we study the relationships between them, both at a syntactic and at a semantic level. It is not possible to establish an entailment system map between them, but both can be naturally simulated in each other. Semantically, there is no embedding between the corresponding institutions. We also use the syntactic results to prove re ective properties of CRWL and to extend those already known for Meseguer's rewriting logic.
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to study in detail, and to clarify to some extent, the relationships between two well known approaches to rewriting as logical deduction, namely, Jos e Meseguer's rewriting logic 12] , and the constructor-based rewriting logic (CRWL) developed by Mario Rodr guez Artalejo's research group in Madrid 9] .
The rst of these was proposed as a logical framework wherein to represent other logics, and also as a semantic framework for the speci cation of languages and systems. The experience accumulated throughout the last years has come to support that original intention; in particular, it has been shown that rewriting logic is a very exible framework in which many other logics, including rstorder logic, intuitionistic logic, linear logic, Horn logic with equality, as well as any other logic with a sequent calculus, can be represented. An important characteristic of these representations that should be stressed is that they are usually quite simple and natural, so that their mathematical properties are often straightforward to derive.
On the other hand, the goal of the constructor-based rewriting logic is to serve as a logical basis for declarative programming languages involving lazy evaluation, o ering support, in addition, to non-strict and possibly non-deterministic functions.
Despite these di erences there is a clear resemblance between both logics, namely, the fact that logical deduction is based on rewriting. It seems natural, then, to ask about the relationships between deduction in these logics, and to extend the question so as to encompass whether the corresponding models are also related.
A suitable framework in which to carry out this study is the theory of general logics developed by Meseguer 10] . There, a logic is described in a very abstract manner and two separated components are distinguished in it: an entailment system and an institution, corresponding with the syntactic and the semantic parts of the logic, respectively.
We will begin by studying derivability and, for that, we will try to associate entailment systems to both logics. Unfortunately, it will be proven that there is none corresponding to deduction in CRWL, and so we will be forced to leave the formal framework and undertake more informal simulations of the logics in each other. Although such simulations could be possible by making use of suitable down-level encodings, relying on the analogies between both logics, our interest resides in nding natural and simple simulations which at least show that their expressive power is the same. In addition, these results will be used to study re ective properties of both logics.
After the comparison at the syntactic level, the next step is the study of the corresponding models. Now we will be able to associate an institution to each logic, so this study will take place within the formal framework of the theory of institutions. The main result we will obtain is that models in these logics bear no relation at all, and through its way we will clarify some subtle points regarding the de nition of models in Meseguer's rewriting logic.
A detailed account of all the results presented here can be found in 15].
Notation
We will write RL for Meseguer's rewriting logic; more precisely, for the version which uses unsorted and unconditional equational logic as its underlying logic.
A signature in RL is a pair ( ; E) with a ranked alphabet of function symbols and E a set of -equations. Rewriting operates on equivalence classes of terms modulo the set of equations E. We denote by T (X ) the -algebra of -terms with variables in a set X, and by t] E or just t] the E-equivalence class of t 2 T (X ). To indicate that fx 1 ; : : : ; x n g is the set of variables occurring in t we write t(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ). Given t(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), and terms u 1 ; : : : ; u n , t(u 1 =x 1 ; : : : ; u n =x n ) denotes the term obtained from t by simultaneously substituting u i for x i , i = 1; : : : ; n. To simplify notation we denote a sequence of objects a 1 ; : : : ; a n by a. For a complete exposition of RL we refer the reader to 12].
CRWL uses signatures with constructors = C F , where C and F are disjoint sets of constructor and de ned function symbols, respectively. ? refers to the signature which is obtained from by adding a new constructor ? of arity 0. Given a set X of variables, we will write Expr( ; X) for the set of expressions which can be built with and X, and Term( ; X) for those terms which only make use of C and X. Expr ? ( ; X) and Term ? ( ; X), the sets of partial expressions and terms, are de ned analogously using ? .
A CRWL-theory is a pair ( ; ?), where is a signature with constructors, and ? is a set of conditional rewrite rules of the form f(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) ! r ( a 1 ./ b 1 ; : : : ; a n ./ b n (m 0); with f a function symbol, and t 1 ; : : : ; t n 2 Term( ; X). From a given theory two kinds of sentences are derived: reduction statements of the form a ! b, and joinability statements a ./ b (meaning that there exists a total term to which both a and b reduce). Again, we refer to 9] for a presentation of the CRWLcalculus and its model-theoretic semantics. (Note that in 9] the names \term" and \constructor term" are used instead of \expression" and \term".)
Entailment Systems for RL and CRWL
We begin by studying the notion of derivation in RL and CRWL. This notion is abstractly captured by Meseguer's entailment systems, which are given by a category Sign of signatures together with, for each signature , a set of sentences, and an entailment relation` between sets of sentences and sentences, satisfying some conditions. Among those conditions is transitivity: if ?` ' i for all i 2 I, and ? f' i j i 2 Ig` , then ?` . Our goal is to associate entailment systems to both RL and CRWL, and then to relate them by maps of entailment systems.
Assigning an entailment system to RL is a relatively straightforward task: either we restrict to unconditional rewrite rules and de ne` by means of derivation in the RL-calculus 12], or we also consider conditional rules, in which case the RL-calculus must be extended to be able to derive them 15]. The basic rewriting calculi for both logics are shown in Fig. 1 .
At rst sight, the same two possibilities hold for CRWL. However, a closer look reveals that derivation in the CRWL-calculus 9]. is not transitive. Consider, for example, a signature with c; d; h 2 , function symbols of arities 0, 0, and 1, respectively. Then it can be proved that
The reason for this is that the CRWL-calculus is sound and complete with respect to validity in models only under totally de ned valuations 9]. In particular, in 3 Simulating CRWL in RL As there does not exist an entailment system associated to the CRWL-calculus, we cannot de ne a map of entailment systems as intended. In the following we will be pleased just with presenting how entailment in CRWL can be simulated in RL. The set of labels of an RL-theory does not take part in the entailment process, and so it is omitted; the same convention will also be adopted in Sects. 4 and 5.
Of course, every CRWL-theory T can be trivially \simulated" in RL by means of an RL-theory T 0 with a constant c t for each term (and each expression) t in T, and with axioms c t ! c t 0 whenever t ! t 0 . But such a T 0 is not computable in general, and this is a property that will be required in Sect. 6 when we apply the simulation to the study of re ection in CRWL. And so we must look for another construction.
The idea is to associate to every CRWL-theory T a theory T 0 in RL (whose set of equational axioms will be empty) in which all the operations in T, together with a new constant ?, are available, plus one rule for each axiom in T and, perhaps, some more rules coping with the rules of deduction of the CRWLcalculus. Since rules in CRWL can only be instantiated with terms and not expressions, we introduce a unary relation pterm (technically, a unary function) and a constant true to distinguish them in RL. One immediate rule de ning pterm is pterm(?) ! true; however, how to express that variables are also partial terms? The obvious rule pterm(x) ! true is clearly not valid: everything would be a partial term! This means that we must add the CRWL variables to the signature of T 0 as constants, and use a new set X of variables for RL. This way, assuming variables in CRWL belong to a set V, the rules de ning pterm will be pterm(?) ! true pterm(v i ) ! true (8v i 2 V) pterm(h(x 1 ; : : : ; x n )) ! true if pterm(x 1 ) ! true^: : :^pterm(x n ) ! true (8h 2 C n ; n 2 IN);
In a similar way, two more predicates, pexpr and tterm, dealing with partial expressions and total terms, are de ned 15]. As a side e ect, rewriting in CRWL can no longer be simulated in RL directly through the rewriting relation. Consider, for example, the theory of natural numbers in CRWL, with 0 a constructor and + a function symbol. In RL, pterm(0+0)
should not rewrite to true; however, with the usual de nitions, 0 + 0 ! 0 and by congruence pterm(0 + 0) ! pterm(0), and this last term must reduce to true.
Therefore, a rewrite in CRWL will be simulated through a binary relation R so that e ! e 0 in CRWL if and only if R(e; e 0 ) ! true in RL. In a similar way, strict equalities a ./ b will be simulated through a binary relation ./.
It just remains to translate the rules of deduction of the CRWL-calculus, which is straightforward. For example, the bottom rule stating that every ex- We will write (T ) for the RL-theory associated to a CRWL-theory T. The following proposition ensures us that the translation is correct. 4 Simulating RL in CRWL
We now embark ourselves on ndind the converse simulation of RL in CRWL. We are still interested in a computable and simple translation, and the idea for this is very similar to that of the previous section. Now, however, there are no terms and expressions to distinguish, and so predicates such as pterm are no longer necessary; as a consequence, we will be able to use the same set X of variables for both logics. The fact that only joinability statements are allowed to appear in the condition of a rewrite rule in CRWL forces us to represent, as in Sect. 3, the rewriting relation in RL through a binary relation R in CRWL, so that t ! t 0 in RL if and only if R(t; t 0 ) ! true in CRWL; rewriting modulo a set of equations will be handled by transforming each equation t = t 0 into the rewrites t ! t 0 and t 0 ! t.
More precisely, given a signature ( ; E) in RL we associate to it a CRWLtheory over the signature 0 with C 0 = ftrueg and F 0 = fRg, with true and R of arities 0 and 2, respectively. The rules in the theory are R(x 1 ; x 2 ) ! true ( x 1 ./ x 2 ;
R(x; y) ! true ( R(x; z) ./ true; R(z; y) ./ true; and, for each f 2 n , n 2 IN, R(f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ); f(y 1 ; : : : ; y n )) ! true ( R(x 1 ; y 1 ) ./ true; : : : ; R(x n ; y n ) ./ true; mimicking the re exivity, transitivity, and congruence rules in the RL-calculus, together with R(t; t 0 ) ! true and R(t 0 ; t) ! true; for every t = t 0 2 E. The goal of the condition in the rule corresponding to re exivity is to avoid instantiating it with terms containing ?, which In fact, the previous de nitions must be slightly modi ed due to some technical details. In a conditional rewrite rule l ! r ( C in CRWL, l must be linear, and it is obvious that with the above de nitions this property is not ensured for the translation of equations and rewrite rules; therefore, those rules must be \linearised" (see 1, 15] ).
In what follows, we write (T ) for the CRWL-theory associated to a RLtheory T. The next proposition guarantees the correctness of the translation. A further distinction concerns the treatment of variables. CRWL has no types so, given the function symbols of a membership equational signature, we could use them to build more terms than those that we would have in the original logic and, moreover, the use of such terms would enlarge the set of provable statements in a theory. So it will be necessary to distinguish somehow the welltyped terms and, for that, we are forced again to represent variables in MERL as constants in CRWL. The task of recognising well-typed terms will be carried out by a binary function symbol wtterm in such a way that wtterm(t; k) ! true if and only if the term t has kind k. We can use V for the set of variables in MERL and X for the variables in CRWL.
Let then ((K; ; S); E) be a MERL signature, i.e., a membership equational logic theory. We associate to it a CRWL-theory with signature 0 such that In what follows, we will write (T ) for the CRWL-theory associated to a MERL-theory T. We have the following two main results. Proposition 3. Let T be an RL-theory with signature ((K; ; S); E), ( 
Re ection in CRWL and in RL
Intuitively, a re ective logic is a logic in which important aspects of its metatheory, such as the concepts of theory and entailment, can be represented and reasoned about in the logic. A general axiomatic notion of re ective logic was proposed by Clavel and Meseguer 3, 5] . The notion is itself expressed in terms of the notion of an entailment system.
Given an entailment system E and a nonempty set of theories C in it, a theory U is C-universal if there is a function, called a representation function, (`) : T2C (fT g sen(T )) ! sen(U); such that for each T 2 C, ' 
sen(T ), T`' i U`T`':
If, in addition, U 2 C, then the entailment system E is called C-re ective. Finally, a re ective logic is a logic whose entailment system is C-re ective for C the class of all nitely presentable theories in the logic. The condition that the representation function be computable and injective has also been required recently 6].
RL has been proved to be re ective in 3, 5, 6] and we will use this result to obtain an analogous one for CRWL. Strictly speaking, the notion of re ection does not apply to CRWL as it was observed in Sect. 3 that CRWL does not have an associated entailment system. Even in the case of RL, except for the original result in 3], subsequent generalizations do not immediately t within the formal de nition of re ection as they allow conditional sentences on the left of the entailment relation but not on the right. For this reason, in what follows we consider a \loose" de nition of re ection (making use of some kind of \weak" entailment system) general enough to encompass all the cases just discussed.
Let U be a universal theory for RL; we will use it to prove that CRWL is also re ective. In Sects. 3 and 4 we de ned mappings and that map a theory T in CRWL, respectively in RL, to a theory in RL, respectively in CRWL, which simulates the behaviour of T. By abuse of notation we will also use and to name the translation of sequents de ned in those sections. (Recall that (T ) is not obtained by simply applying to every ' 2 T, and analogously for .) Then,
given an arbitrary CRWL-theory T and a statement ', we have the following chain of equivalences:
which proves that (U) is universal in CRWL (and, since was quite simple, no much more complicated than the original U).
As it has been pointed out previously, the re ective results about RL have been proved only for special cases. The one we need here is that in which the underlying equational logic is unsorted and the rules are conditional 6]. Moreover, the results presented here allow us to extend the re ective results to the full power of MERL. For that we can consider that yields theories in MERL, because unsorted equational logic is naturally embeddable in membership equational logic, and let be the function de ned in Sect. 5 such that, for T a MERL-theory, T`M ERL ' () (T )`C RWL ('). Then, for W any universal theory in CRWL (like (U), for example),
which proves that (W ) is universal in MERL. In Maude, a speci cation and programming language based on RL, re ection is exploited systematically to extend the language with program transformation methods and internal strategies 4]. In particular, a exible and robust module algebra incorporating parameterisation and object-oriented features into the language has been built in 8]. In T OY, an experimental language and system that implements the CRWL paradigm, up til now re ection has played no role at all. A possible reason could be that re ection on its own were not a su cient condition for many results, but required the existence of other logical properties. On the other hand, it could simply be that more attention has to be paid to it, so that a closer look may reveal some possible applications.
An Institution for CRWL
In this section we leave behind our study of the entailment relation and turn our attention to models and satisfaction. Our interest consists in associating suitable institutions to both CRWL and RL and, thereafter, to relate them via maps of institutions with \good" properties.
A rst step towards this direction is taken in 14], where an institution is associated to CRWL. This institution is de ned with the goal of providing a basis for the semantics of modules in CRWL, and restricts its attention to a class of particular term algebras. Since our objective is more general, we do not place such a limitation and de ne I CRWL = (Sign; sen; Mod; j =) as follows: It can be proved that the category Mod(T ) has products for every CRWLtheory T; it is not complete, however, as in Sect. 9 it is shown that, in general, Mod(T ) does not have equalizers. I CRWL is also a semiexact institution 15].
An Institution for RL
The task of assigning an institution to RL is harder than expected. The rst and more natural idea is to de ne the category of signatures Sign as the category of equational theories and theory morphisms, and the functor sen to map any such theory to the set of conditional rewrite rules over it. Since there are also notions of model and satisfaction in RL 12], the desired institution seems to be at hand. However, when one tries to put together the various components of the institution, problems start to arise. In the rst place, the notion of satisfaction in RL is de ned only for unconditional rewrite rules, so our rst task must be to extend its de nition so as to encompass the conditional ones. Although there are at least two possible ways in which this could be done, this is a relatively minor problem which can be solved by mirroring the de nition of R-systems (see 15]).
A far more serious problem is posed by the functor Mod : Sign op ! Cat, mapping signatures to models. The di culty resides in the fact that, in RL, models are assigned directly to RL-theories instead of signatures, as it is customary in other logics. One obvious solution would be to consider a signature ( ; E) as a theory R = ( ; E; ;; ;) with empty set of axioms (and labels), and to map ( ; E) to the category R-Sys of models of R 12] . But this approach presents an important drawback. Up to this point in the paper, we have omitted any explicit mention of the set of labels of an RL-theory. Although this was a safe convention when talking about deduction, it is not longer the case when our interest shifts to models. Due to the set of labels L in an RL-theory R = ( ; E; L; ?), the elements of ? become special, labelled rewrite rules. These rules force R-systems to have a certain internal structure: not only R-systems must satisfy them, but also must associate to them a distinguished interpretation (natural transformation) that must be preserved by homomorphisms 1 . When considering a signature as a theory with empty sets of axioms, we are not taking into account labelled rewrite rules. This way, homomorphisms are not subjected to preserve any rewrite rule Since Sign is discrete, this trivially de nes an institution. Admittedly, this restriction seems to be not justi ed. In fact, two types of morphisms of RL-theories are proposed in 11]. Basically, they are equational theory morphisms \preserv-ing" the rules in the RL-theories; a complete study of the institution I RL extended with these morphisms will be undertaken in a future occasion. For our purposes, the present de nition is general enough as it stands, and its extension would not modify the use we will make of it in the next section.
There exist other institutions associated to (varieties of) RL in the literature, e.g., 2, 7] ; in these papers, the objects in the category of signatures are the sets of function symbols, without any rules. As a consequence of this simplicity and because of the reasons we have mentioned above, the general categorical models of RL must be somehow restricted, and the choice in these two papers is to require them to be preorders instead of general categories.
Searching for Embeddings
We would like to relate the institutions I CRWL and I RL by means of a map of institutions ( ; ; ) : I CRWL ! I RL having nice properties, in such a way that it indicated that I CRWL could be considered as a subinstitution of I RL . The formal de nition of subinstitution appeared originally in 10] and has been further generalized in subsequent articles. One of those extensions was introduced by Meseguer in 13], where it is called an embedding. The only requirement imposed on a map of institutions ( ; ; ) : I ! I 0 to be an embedding is that for each T 2 Th I , the functor T : Mod 0 ( (T )) ! Mod(T ) must be an equivalence of categories.
We will show, however, that there is no embedding from I CRWL into I RL .
For that it will be enough to nd a categorical property which is preserved by an equivalence of categories and a theory T 2 Th CRWL such that Mod RL ( (T )), but not Mod CRWL (T ), has the property.
Let be a signature with constructors such that C = ; and F consists of just two constants f 1 Admittedly, although this counterexample formally solves the problem, it is so particular that it cannot be considered to truly re ect the real di erences between RL and CRWL. Future work should concentrate on nding a more illustrative example.
Conclusions
The main outcome of the research carried out in this paper has been the clarication of the relationship between RL and CRWL. Both logics have been proved to be expressive enough to simulate deduction in each other in a simple way, though resorting to binary predicates. On the other hand, the results on institutions have shown that neither can RL be considered as a sublogic of CRWL, nor can CRWL with respect to RL. During the preparation of this work we have been forced to take a close look at the notions of entailment system and institution, and the di culties we have found have shown us that intuition can be misleading in this eld. The conclusion we have reached is that it would be very convenient to develop some kind of generalization of these concepts. One reason supporting this claim is the fact that, although it seems clear that CRWL should t within the frame of entailment systems, the lack of the transitivity property forbids it to be considered so. In addition, there have been several occasions wherein we have had to make a distinction between two types of sentences within the same logic. The most outstanding case was that of labelled and unlabelled rewrite rules in RL, but we should also emphasize that rules in CRWL-programs are a restricted class of the more general class of reduction statements, and that, when we talked about re ection, we had to \weaken" its de nition in order to encompass some of the results about RL, due to conditional sentences not being treated like unconditional ones. What all these examples have in common is that sentences belonging to a theory are given a di erent treatment from the rest of sentences and, with the current de nitions of entailment system and institution, there is no way of taking this distinction into account.
For future work, besides the generalizations just mentioned, it would be interesting to complete the de nition of the institution I RL with signature morphisms (morphisms of RL-theories), as well as nding a more illustrative example showing the reasons why RL is not embeddable in CRWL.
